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Abstract
In this essay I try to indicate that Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics together 
with the ontological effects of hermeneutics result in “conversation,” that is, in some-
thing “weak,” as Rorty explained, “in comparison to scientific inquiry”. While con-
temporary philosophers as Nancy, Derrida, and Vattimo have given different answers 
to Being’s condition after metaphysics, they all agree that it must be a concept which 
can easily be modified, attuned, and open to further interpretations. But in order to 
demonstrate that Being is conversation, as I suggest, it is first necessary to outline the 
remains of Being that Heidegger’s destruction exposed and the ontological effects 
that interpretation implies. While I have exposed these remains in my book, The 
Remains of Being, in this essay I try to indicate how “conversation” is a remain. 
“Conversation” will become not only the most appropriate result of Heidegger’s de-
struction of metaphysics but also, as Vattimo has emphasized, “what interpretation 
can generate,” that is, “Being, new senses of experience, new ways for the world to 
announce itself ”.
Keywords: Heidegger, Metaphysics, Hermeneutics, Conversation, Rorty
Resumen
En este ensayo trato de mostrar que la destrucción de la metafísica de Heidegger jun-
to a los efectos ontológicos de la hermenéutica dan lugar a la “conversación”, esto es, 
a algo “débil” en comparación con la investigación científica, tal y como Rorty ha 
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The answer to the question, 
“What is philosophy?” consists in our corre-
sponding to that towards which philosophy is 
on the way. And that is—the Being of being. In 
such a correspondence we listen from the very 
outset to that which philosophy has already said 
to us, philosophy, that is, “philosophia” under-
stood in the Greek sense. That is why we attain 
correspondence, that is, an answer to our ques-
tion, only when we remain in conversation 
with that to which the tradition of philosophy 
delivers us, that is, liberates us. We find the an-
swer to the question, “What is philosophy?” 
not through historical assertions about the def-
initions of philosophy but through conversing 
with that which has been handed down to us 
as the Being of being.2
—Martin Heidegger, What Is 
Philosophy? (1956)
A mong the most important consequences of Heidegger’s destruction of Being as pre-sence, in addition to the over-coming of metaphysics and the elevation of hermeneutics 
to the center of philosophical 
concern, is the weakening of Being to its own 
remains. While few Heideggerian scholars con-
sider the German master’s philosophical des-
truction as a weakening of Being, most con-
temporary hermeneutic philosophers agree that 
he is the first to have given ontological import 
to hermeneutics. For such authors as Donald 
Davidson, Roland Dworkin, and Nancy Ho-
lland, philosophical interpretation has become 
not only a philosophical problem in itself but 
also the ground to start overcoming the divi-
sion between analytic and continental philoso-
phy. While most contemporary analytic phi-
2 Die Antwort auf die Frage: Was ist das—die Philosophie? besteht darin, dass wir dem entsprechen, wohin die Philosophie unter-
wegs ist. Und das ist: das Sein des Seienden. In solchen Entsprechen hören wir von Anfang an auf das, was die Philosophie uns 
schon zugesprochen hat, die Philosophie, d. h. die griechisch verstandene. Deshalb gelangen wir nur so in die Entsprechung, d. h. 
zur Antwort auf unsere Frage, dass wir im Gespräch mit dem bleiben, wohin uns die Überlieferung der Philosophie ausliefert, d. 
h. befreit. Wir finden die Antwort auf die Frage, was die Philosophie sei, nicht durch historische Aussagen über die Definitionen 
der Philosophie, sondern durch das Gespräch mit dem, was sich uns als Sein des Seienden überliefert hat. (Heidegger, M., What is 
Philosophy? Trans. J. T. Wilde and W. Kluback, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 70).
señalado. Mientras que filósofos contemporáneos como Nancy, Derrida y Vattimo 
ofrecen diferentes respuestas acerca de la condición del Ser después de la metafísica, 
todos ellos están de acuerdo en que debe tratarse de un concepto fácilmente modifi-
cable y abierto a diversas interpretaciones. Pero para demostrar que el Ser es conver-
sación, tal y como sugiero, es necesario en primer lugar subrayar los remanentes del 
Ser que la destrucción de Heidegger deja al descubierto así como los efectos ontoló-
gicos que esta interpretación implica. Mientras que en mi libro Los remanentes del Ser 
he expuesto estos remanentes, en este ensayo intento mostrar que la “conversación” es 
un remanente. La “Conversación” será no sólo el resultado más apropiado de la des-
trucción de la metafísica llevada a cabo por Heidegger sino también, tal y como Vat-
timo ha subrayado, “lo que la interpretación puede generar”, esto es, “el Ser, nuevos 
sentidos de la experiencia, nuevos modos para el mundo de anunciarse a sí mismo”.
Palabras clave: Heidegger, metafísica, hermenéutica, conversación, Rorty
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losophies (such as that of J. Searle) continue 
to restrict ontology to a scientific focus from 
the empiricist tradition, and continental phi-
losophers (such as J-L. Marion) firmly main-
tain the objectivist intentionality of their 
phenomenologist tradition, today, half a cen-
tury after the publication of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s Truth and Method, hermeneutics 
has the opportunity to leave aside these tradi-
tional metaphysical aspirations for indubita-
ble knowledge.
Philosophical hermeneutics should no 
longer be presented as another variation of 
continental philosophy against analytical phi-
losophy but rather as the dissolution of such 
division among disciplines, where language is 
not used to represent reality but to help break 
“the crust of convention of the epistemology 
industry”, as John Dewey would say. While a 
new interchangeable framework already has 
begun to take shape in the fusing together of 
problems from both traditions in such authors 
as Karl-Otto Apel, Ernst Tugendhat, and John 
McDowell, this same framework will not be-
come the thought of the twenty-first century 
until it overcomes metaphysics in a produc-
tive way. However, if hermeneutics can present 
itself as the postmetaphysical thought of the 
twenty-first century it is not only because its 
best practitioners (Schleiermacher, Dilthey, 
and Nietzsche) have broke ground for it while 
others from both traditions (Thomas Kuhn, 
Michael Theunissen, and Rüdiger Bubner) 
have developed it, but rather because it has 
become the most appropriate response to 
Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics. How-
ever, this has occurred only because herme-
neutics has left its conservative focus on dia-
logue and become a progressive conversational 
philosophy where success, as Rorty pointed 
out, is measured by “horizons fused rather 
than problems solved, or even by problems 
dissolved”.3 More than a philosophical posi-
tion in search of Being’s origins, hermeneutics, 
through Vattimo and Rorty, has become a sys-
tem of thought that aims to discover Beings 
effects.
The goal of this essay is to demonstrate 
that Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics 
together with the ontological effects of herme-
neutics will result in “conversation”, that is, 
in something “weak”, as Rorty explained, “in 
comparison to scientific inquiry”.4 But in or-
der to demonstrate that Being is conversation 
it is first necessary to outline the remains of 
Being that Heidegger’s destruction exposed 
and the ontological effects that interpretation 
implies. “Conversation” will become not only 
the most appropriate result of Heidegger’s 
destruction of metaphysics but also, as Vatti-
mo has emphasized, “what interpretation can 
generate”, that is, “Being, new senses of expe-
rience, new ways for the world to announce 
itself ”.5 
Before venturing into the remains of Be-
ing, it should be pointed out that Reiner Schür-
mann and Jacques Derrida are among the 
few philosophers who have granted destruc-
tion the central role it deserves in Heidegger’s 
thought. Derrida practiced deconstruction as 
his postmetaphysical system, and Schürmann 
indicated that such practice may only occur in 
the “absence of foundations”. Although they 
are both original interpreters of Heidegger’s 
destruction of metaphysics, only Vattimo and 
Rorty have inherited its ontological conse-
quences and, through hermeneutics, used them 
as a way to overcome metaphysics: the first 
by interpreting destruction as the weakening 
of Being into its remains and the second indi-
cating the conversational nature of such Be-
3 Rorty, R., “Being That Can Be Understood is Language,” in Gadamer’s Repercussion: Reconsidering Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. 
B. Krajewski (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004), p. 29. 
4 Rorty, R., The Future of Religion, with Gianni Vattimo, ed. S. Zabala (New York, Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 68.
5 Vattimo, G. After Christianity, trans. L. D’Isanto (New York, Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 67.
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ing.6 Both Vattimo and Rorty not only radi-
cally developed Heidegger’s destruction into 
“weak thought” but also followed the German 
master’s most innovative request: to “work out 
Being for itself anew”.7 Having said this, it 
should not come as a surprise that these are 
among the few interpreters of Heidegger who 
tend to reject the so-called turn that the Ger-
man master supposedly went through after the 
publication of Being and Time, that is, from an 
analysis of Dasein’s being to a consideration of 
the history of the epochs of Being. Those in-
terpreters who emphasize this turn also tend 
to consider Being and Time the only text 
where Heidegger produces innovative philoso-
phy when in fact the analysis of Being is a con-
stant throughout his writings. 
However, Heidegger’s philosophy of Be-
ing was also a progressive development that al-
lowed him to respond to the destruction he 
imposed on Being. A confirmation of this can 
be found in his preface to the seventh German 
edition (1953) of Being and Time, where 
Heidegger claims that for an elucidation of the 
question of Being “the reader may refer [to] 
my Introduction to Metaphysics”.8 While this 
text is only a lecture course he delivered at the 
University of Freiburg in the summer semester 
of 1935, it is also the first one Heidegger chose 
to present for general publication in 1953. This 
is not only the most significant of Heidegger’s 
texts after Being and Time but also the essential 
explication of Being and Time. If in the 1927 
magnum opus the central concern was the 
question of Being, it is in this text that this same 
question is finally “elucidated”. Also, the de-
struction did not begin in Being and Time but 
rather in his courses in Freiburg and Marburg of 
1923 entitled “Ontology—the Hermeneutics 
of Facticity” which continued throughout his 
volumes on Nietzsche and in his notes in Contri-
butions to Philosophy (From Enowning). Through-
out these texts, Being was both a constant prob-
lem and a progressive response, adapting not 
only to its own destruction but also to the new 
fundamental questions this brought about, as 
I will show. In sum, “destruction” is not an iso-
lated word within Heidegger’s works; rather, as 
Vattimo has emphasized, it stands for the to-
tality of a path to follow: the history of the 
weakening of Being. 
Heidegger probably borrowed the term 
“Destruktion” from Luther’s Heidelberger Dis-
putation of 1518 where the church reformer 
used it to dismantle institutional theology in 
the name of the authenticity of the evangelical 
message. Nevertheless, contrary to the theolo-
gian’s intentions, Heidegger was not looking 
for authentic or original Being but rather seek-
ing to free it from a too objective an interpre-
tation, which limited its existential possibili-
ties through excluding binary polarities such 
as Being vs. nothingness, truth vs. error, or 
mind vs. matter. These polarities arose from 
understanding the objects of the world inde-
pendently of our existence, that is, as things in 
themselves. However, if this were the case and 
we only had to re-present these objects in their 
timeless presence, that is, give scientific objec-
tive accounts, then our Being would become 
an object as any other. Instead, as Heidegger 
immediately explained in Being and Time, we 
have a relation to our Being that is called “ex-
istence” because it is a self-relationship, hence 
a Being-relationship: the “ontic Dasein dis-
tinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is on-
tological.”9 From the start destruction was not 
a matter finding the true Being, but rather of 
venturing into a historico-theoretical inquiry 
of the Being of beings.
6 A complete recapitulation of the consequences of Heidegger’s destruction can be found in the second chapter of my The Remains 
of Being: Ontology After Heidegger (New York, Columbia University Press, forthcoming).
7 Heidegger, M., Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. G. Fried and R. Polt, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 90.
8 Heidegger, M., Being and Time, trans. J. Stambaugh (New York, State University of New York Press), p. xvii.
9 Heidegger, M., Being and Time, p. 10.
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A confirmation of this comes from Hei-
degger’s criticism of the conception of truth as 
correspondence—“veritas est adaequatio rei et 
intellectus”—since it presupposes the idea of 
an original Being that would work as an insur-
mountable first principle. Although this tradi-
tional theory of truth is already a consequence 
of the metaphysical interpretation of Being, 
that is, where the distinction between the es-
sence and existence of things went forgotten, 
Heidegger did not criticize it in order to find a 
truer theory but rather because, as Otto Pögge-
ler explained, he was looking for a “different 
conceptual platform”. Pöggeler was the first to 
notice this and recalls how already “in his first 
lectures Heidegger put forward the demand to 
take into account the practical and religious 
truth together with the theoretical one”.10 This 
is why Heidegger’s understanding of truth as 
disclosedness was not meant for a particular dis-
cipline or cultural paradigm but rather for 
thought in general, that is, for the forgotten 
space between Being and beings: the ontologi-
cal difference. 
While Heidegger’s ontological difference 
can be interpreted as an outcome of the de-
struction of metaphysics, it is not something 
introduced by the philosopher in order to 
arrest the investigation;11 rather, as he speci-
fied in Being and Time, it is the “point of de-
parture for the ontological problematic”.12 
This is why Heidegger explained in 1956 that 
the meaning of philosophy should not be 
sought in
historical assertions about the 
definitions of philosophy but through con-
versing with that which has been handed 
down to us as the Being of being. This path 
to the answer to our question is not a break 
with history, no repudiation of history, but is 
an adoption and transformation of what has 
been handed down to us. Such an adoption of 
history is what is meant by the term “destruc-
tion”... Destruction does not mean destroy-
ing but dismantling, liquidating, putting to 
one side the merely historical assertions about 
the history of philosophy. Destruction means—
to open our ears, to make ourselves free for 
what speaks to us in tradition as the Being of 
being.13
As we can see, Heidegger’s destruction 
was not meant to discover the ontological dif-
ference but rather to move us into such differ-
ence, that is, into the thought of Being. But 
what does such thought imply? First of all, 
that philosophy since Plato has not only been 
a “forgetfulness of Being” but also an expres-
sion of Being’s remains. If Heidegger repeat-
edly insisted that “es gibt Sein [there is Being]” 
and “nous sommes sur un plan où il y a princi-
palement l’Etre [we are precisely in a situation 
where principally there is Being]”,14 it is be-
cause Being is an event that overcomes all met-
aphysical, or, which is the same, descriptive in-
quiries that would eventually fulfill our needs. 
For this reason, rather than the truth of Being, 
we are left with the remains of Being, since 
to “remain”, explained Heidegger, means “not to 
10 Pöggeler, O., “Heideggers logische Untersuchungen”, in Martin Heidegger: Innen-und Aussenansichten. Forum für Philosophie Bad 
Hamburg (Frankfurt: M. Suhrkamp, 1989), 75-100. 
11 There is an interesting testimonial by Gadamer that shows how, for Heidegger, the ontological difference was not something 
produced by the philosopher: “I still recall”, says Gadamer, “quite clearly how, in Marburg, the young Heidegger developed this 
concept of the ‘ontological difference’ in the sense of the difference between being and beings, between ousia and on. One day, as 
Gerhard Krüger and I accompanied Heidegger home, one of the two of us raised the question of what, then, the significance of 
this ontological distinction was, how and when one must make this distinction. I will never forget Heidegger’s answer: Make? Is 
the ontological difference something that must be made? That is a misunderstanding. This difference is not something introduced 
by the philosopher’s thinking so as to distinguish between being and beings” (Gadamer, H.-G., The Beginning of Philosophy, trans. 
R. Coltman [New York, Continuum, 2001], p. 123).
12 Heidegger, M., Being and Time, trans. J. Stambaugh (New York: State University of New York Press), p. 397.
13 Heidegger, M., What Is Philosophy? trans. J. T. Wilde and W. Kluback (New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 71-73.
14 Heidegger, M., Pathmarks, ed. W. McNeill (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 251.
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disappear, thus, to presence”;15 in other words, 
remains are those worn-out fragments that are 
not only left after use but also survive. In this 
way, the enduring Being for Heidegger is not 
the strongest but, on the contrary, the worn-
out, weakest, and vaporous word of which there 
is nothing as such and which is never exhaust-
ed in the present of its inscription. 
A confirmation of this consequence of de-
struction comes from Heidegger’s lecture deliv-
ered at Freiburg in the winter semester of 1941. 
In §11, entitled “Being Is the Most Worn-Out 
[“abgegriffen”] and at the Same Time the Ori-
gin,” we find the following statements:
We need Being because we need 
it in all relations to beings. In this constant 
and multiple use, Being is in a certain way ex-
pended. And yet we cannot say that Being is 
used up in this expenditure. Being remains 
constantly available to us. Would we wish to 
maintain, however, that this use of being, 
which we constantly rely upon, leaves Being so 
untouched? Is it not Being at least consumed 
in use? Does not the indifference of the “is”, 
which occurs in all saying, attest to the worn-
ness of what we thus name? Being is certainly 
not grasped, but it is nevertheless worn-out 
and thus also “empty” and “common.” Being is 
the most worn-out. Being stands everywhere 
and at each moment in our understanding as 
what is most self-understood. It is thus the 
most worn-out coin with which we constantly 
pay for every relation to beings, without which 
payment no relation to beings as beings would 
be allotted us.16
Heidegger, in this significant passage, by 
indicating that “Being remains constantly avail-
able to us” is not only foretasting its condition 
(“worn-out”)17 but also specifying how the 
thought of Being, that is, metaphysics in gen-
eral, cannot be overcome, “überwindung”, but 
only surpassed, come to terms with, “verwind-
ung.” While “überwindung” refers to a com-
plete abandonment of the problem, “verwind-
ung” instead alludes to the way one surpasses a 
major disappointment not by forgetting it but 
by coming to terms with it or, as Heidegger 
said, “what happens when, in the human realm, 
one works through grief or pain”.18 While this 
is not the only passage where Heidegger ex-
poses the state of Being after metaphysics,19 it 
does indicate that it is not what Being is but 
how it remains that is essential for philosophy 
after its destruction. In other words, the end of 
metaphysics blends with the end of the search 
for Being’s presence since philosophy, after hav-
ing retrieved the question of Being through a 
destruction of its tradition, recognizes that we 
are left with only its remains. In this condition 
the excluding polarity of Being vs. nothingness 
in the traditional question of metaphysics (“why 
are there beings at all instead of nothing?”) fin-
ishes by favoring Being since, as Heidegger 
said, it is Being that first “lets every Being as 
such originate. Being first lets every Being be, 
that means to spring loose and away, to be a 
Being, and as such to be itself ”.20
Philosophy after the destruction of met-
aphysics does not depend anymore on the pos-
sibility that one choice in a polarity might be 
correct but rather on the condition, state, or 
15 Heidegger, M., “Time and Being,” in On Time and Being, trans. J. Stambaugh (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 3.
16 Heidegger, M., Basic Concepts, trans. G. E. Aylesworth (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 51–52. 
17 Since “worn” is the participle of “wear,” meaning “affected,” “exhausted,” or “spent” by long use or action, “worn-out” means 
something that has being used until threadbare, valueless, or useless.
18 Heidegger, M., The Question Concerning Technology, trans. W. Lovitt (New York, Harper & Row, 1977), p. 39.
19 In the volumes on Nietzsche Heidegger specified how “within metaphysics there is nothing to Being as such” (M. Heidegger, 
Nietzsche, vol. 3, trans. D. F. Krell [San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1991], p. 202) and in Off The Beaten Track how the ontological 
difference “can be experienced as something forgotten only... if it has left a trace” (Heidegger, M., Off the Beaten Track, ed. and 
trans. J. Young and K. Haynes [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2002], p. 275). 
20 Heidegger, M., Basic Concepts, p. 52.
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remains of Being. But in order to think of Be-
ing without regard for metaphysics, hence 
without beings, in its actual worn-out state, 
it is necessary to reformulate the traditional 
metaphysical question in such a way as to 
question Being’s condition. This is why in 
the Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger for-
mulated the following question: “Wie steht es 
mit dem Sein?” which I think translates best 
as, “How is it going with Being?”21 Heidegger 
specifies: 
As the fundamental question of 
metaphysics, we ask: “Why are there beings at 
all instead of nothing?” In this fundamental 
question there already resonates the prior ques-
tion: how is it going with Being? What do we 
mean by the words “to be,” Being? In our at-
tempt to answer, we run into difficulties. We 
grasp at the un-graspable. Yet we are increas-
ingly engaged by beings, related to beings, and 
we know about ourselves “as beings.” Being 
now just counts as the sound of a word for us, 
a used-up term. If this is all we have left, then 
we must at least attempt to grasp this last rem-
nant of a possession. This is why we asked: how 
is it going with the word Being?22
As Charles Guignon rightly noted, this 
“question has a colloquial, almost slangy ring 
to it,”23 which confirms that Being now ap-
pears as something weak “from out of which 
stem all beings and even their possible anni-
hilation.”24 Although in Introduction to Meta-
physics one cannot find the term “worn-out,” 
Heidegger does comment that Nietzsche is 
“entirely right when he calls the ‘highest con-
cepts’ such as Being ‘the final wisp of evapo-
rating reality’”.25 Being is no longer a present-
at-hand fact but “the fundamental happening, 
the only ground upon which historical Dasein 
is granted in the midst of beings that are opened 
up as a whole”.26 This text is a confirmation 
that Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics 
does not imply the end of metaphysics, that is, 
of the relation of thinking to Being or of subject 
to object, but only the admission that when 
“we determine how Being and thinking stand 
opposed to each other, we are working with a 
well-worn schema”27 that we cannot overcome. 
Heidegger concluded Introduction to Metaphys-
ics by calling for philosophy to “work out Be-
ing for itself anew”28 because after its destruc-
tion Being cannot be found or discovered but 
must be retained as long as possible, that is, in-
corporated, appropriated, or interpreted. This 
is why several years later Heidegger in “Time 
and Being” would clarify how a “regard for 
metaphysics still prevails even in the intention 
to overcome metaphysics. Therefore, our task, 
is to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphys-
ics to itself ”.29
21 Heidegger, M., Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 35. The translators add a note explaining that the expression “Wie steht es um das 
Sein?” “could be translated more colloquially as ‘What is the status of Being?’ or even ‘What about Being?’ We have kept the Ger-
man in order to preserve Heidegger’s various plays on standing” (35). It is important to notice that Heidegger, on pages 25, 27, 28, 
29, 30, 32, and 70 of the original German edition uses “Wie steht es um das Sein?” and on pages 26, 56, 153, and 154 uses a dif-
ferent formula: “Wie steht es mit dem Sein?” Both versions have been translated as “How does it stand with Being?” Although I agree 
with them that there is not a big difference in meaning between the two formulations, I’ve decided to translate both versions as 
“How is it going with Being?” because it better captures the postmetaphysical formulation of the question, hence the fact that Be-
ing has gone through destruction.
22 Heidegger, M., Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 77. 
23 Guignon, C., “Being as Appearing: Retrieving the Greek Experience of Phusis,” in A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to 
Metaphysics, ed. R. Polt and G. Fried (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 34.
24 Heidegger, M., Basic Concepts, p. 52.
25 Heidegger, M., Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 38. Heidegger is here quoting Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, § 4, “‘Reasons’ in 
Philosophy.”
26 Heidegger, M., Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 216.
27 Heidegger, M., Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 144.
28 Heidegger, M., Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 90.
29 Heidegger, M, “Time and Being”, p. 24.
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Although Heidegger gave several names 
for this task (“An-Denken”, dwelling, appro-
priation), they all belong to the new funda-
mental question of philosophy (“How is it go-
ing with Being?”), which is an invitation to 
continue to think after metaphysics. Now, the 
word “after” does not only allude to the Ger-
man term “Nachdenken”, the “thinking that 
follows”, but also to “following upon”, to the 
“follower of Being”. To engage in “Denken”, 
thinking, is not to analyze but to attend to or 
remember Being since the “Bauen”, to build, 
which comes after the destruction of some-
thing, does not point to the notion of a novel 
construction but to “Hegen”, conservation, 
preservation, and custodianship. This is why 
philosophy after the destruction has become a 
response, an answer to the history of the vari-
ous events of Being that have been handed 
down to us through the language of Being. In 
contrast to the Cartesian attitude, which holds 
as the task of the philosopher grasping what is 
in front of him, the postmetaphysical philos-
opher becomes a listener, a respondent to the 
remains of Being in order to establish a rela-
tion of “audition.” Instead of a philosophical 
description of the origin, presence, or truth 
of Being, philosophy after the destruction of 
metaphysics becomes an interpretation of Be-
ing’s remains.
While Heidegger never named herme-
neutics as the thought he was trying to articu-
late after the destruction of metaphysics, there 
are several indications in his writings that ex-
pose it as the appropriate candidate. For exam-
ple, in the course of 1923 he explained that 
hermeneutics is not meant to achieve knowl-
edge about things “but rather an existential 
knowing, i.e., a Being”.30 In this way, the phil-
osophical problem for hermeneutics is not to 
describe Being as accurately as possible but 
rather to guard, hold, and interpret its remains. 
This is also why Heidegger believes that herme-
neutics is not a philosophy at all but rather the 
interpretation of Being, “which has fallen into 
forgetfulness before today’s philosophers for 
their well-disposed consideration”.31 In addi-
tion, discussing Being and Time with Tezuka 
in the 1950s, Heidegger continued to regard 
hermeneutics as the thought that could call 
man to his essential Being, that is, “to bring 
together what is concealed within the old”.32 
As we can see, Heidegger’s interest in herme-
neutics went beyond the traditional theories of 
interpretation that provided the criteria for un-
derstanding what a text, event, or author really 
meant; he was interested in its ontological ef-
fects. But what are these ontological effects? 
Heidegger would probably respond dif-
ferently to this question, but I believe that the 
ontological effects of interpretation consist in 
Being, that is, generating further remains of Be-
ing. But how can interpretation generate Being 
if, as I said earlier, “es gibt Sein,” or “il y a de 
l’être” always already? Actually, it is just because 
Being is already there that it can be generated 
through interpretation and not created from 
a void. After all, the ontological difference al-
lows us to understand Being as the horizon 
within which we live instead of an independent 
realm to grasp. More than a philosophical posi-
tion in search of Being’s origins, hermeneutics 
has become the postmetaphysical thought that 
Heidegger was looking for to “work out Being 
for itself anew”.
The only contemporary philosophers 
who have conceived hermeneutics as the ap-
propriate system of thought for approaching 
the end of metaphysics are Rorty and Vattimo. 
Both philosophers have dismissed their philo-
sophical traditions, that is, analytic and conti-
nental philosophy, not to search for another 
philosophical position but rather against this 
30 Heidegger, M., Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. J. van Buren (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 14.
31 Heidegger, M., Ontology, p. 16.
32 Heidegger, M., On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York, Harper & Row, 1982), p. 32.
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same search. What binds them together is not 
only their common interest in leaving meta-
physics aside, as Heidegger request, but also in 
transforming philosophy’s obsession with truth 
in favor of a continuation of the conversa-
tion. In sum, Rorty and Vattimo have exposed, 
through their postmetaphysical hermeneutics, 
that “different conceptual platform” Heidegger 
was looking for in order to take into “account,” 
as Pöggeler explained, “the practical and reli-
gious truth together with the theoretical one,” 
that is: “weak thought”.33
Weak though is a term Vattimo formu-
lated in the early 1980s and that Rorty en-
dorsed soon afterward.34 It invites analytic and 
continental philosophers to abandon their met-
aphysical claim to global descriptions of the 
world. In this idea, philosophical, religious, 
and scientific truth are not only circumscribed 
to their own historical paradigms but, most 
of all, conceived only as contingent effects of 
their historical paradigms. The fact that their 
truth claims are weakened should not be in-
terpret as a failure but as a possibility for 
emancipation, that is, for independence from 
an objectivity that restricts horizons. Vattimo, 
by suggesting that Heidegger’s destruction be 
read as the weakening of the structures of met-
aphysics, and Rorty, by indicating how the 
value of philosophy is now “a matter of its re-
lation not to a subject-matter but to the rest of 
the conversation of humankind”,35 have not 
only overcome metaphysics but also empha-
sized its inevitable continuation in herme-
neutics. Weak thought is the common position 
within which Vattimo and Rorty’s herme-
neutics may operate both without falling back 
in metaphysics and also, by generating new 
Being through its own effects. As Vattimo ex-
plains, interpretation
generates Being, new senses of ex-
perience, new ways for the world to announce 
itself, which are not only other than the ones 
announced “before”. Rather, they join the lat-
ter in a sort of discursus whose logic (also in the 
sense of Logos) consists precisely in the continu-
ity. [...] Ontological hermeneutics replaces the 
metaphysics of presence with a concept of Being 
that is essentially constituted by the feature of 
dissolution. Being gives itself not once and for 
all as a simple presence; rather, it occurs as an-
nouncement and grows into the interpreta-
tions that listen and correspond (to Being).36
As we can see, Vattimo’s ontological 
hermeneutics is possible only within the re-
mains of Being, that is, as a continuation, not 
a discovery. While descriptions represent Be-
ing, interpretations generate Being. However, 
this generation is not autonomous but part 
of the continuity of that metaphysics we can-
not overcome. What is made manifest is not 
Being, but the remains of Being, those effects 
of Being that spring only from the ontological 
difference. Although effects, from Latin “effec-
tus”, “performance” or “accomplishment”, can 
be used for various functions,37 it is here under-
stood against hermeneutics’ traditional search 
for causes, origins, or truth. This is why Vatti-
mo defined hermeneutics not only “as the phil-
osophical theory of the interpretative charac-
ter of every experience of truth”, but also the 
only one that is “lucid about itself as no more 
than an interpretation”.38 
33 A detailed history of Vattimo’s weak thought can be found in my introduction to Weakening Philosophy, ed. S. Zabala (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), p. 3-34.
34 R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 6.
35 Rorty, R., Philosophy as Cultural Politics (Cambridge Mass, Cambridge University Press 2007), 129.
36 Vattimo, G., After Christianity, p. 67-68.
37 J. L. Austin has also emphasized the function of “effects” in his theory of “speech acts,” that is, in performance utterances. See 
Austin, J. L., How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955, ed. J. O. Urmson 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1962).
38 Vattimo, G., Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy, trans. D. Webb (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997), 7.
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It is for these same reasons that Rorty 
decided to endorse hermeneutics, which he 
did not consider a philosophical position but 
rather the “expression of hope that the cultural 
space left by the demise of epistemology will 
not be filled”.39 Just as for Vattimo, for Rorty 
philosophical hermeneutics is not a defense of 
human sciences, a challenger of scientific meth-
od, or an opponent of analytic philosophy but 
rather “what we get when we are no longer 
epistemological”.40 If hermeneutics were just 
another discipline or position, that is, the dis-
covery that there are different perspectives 
on the world, it would presuppose a concep-
tion of truth as the objective mirror of how 
things are, which Rorty wants to avoid.41 Avoid-
ing this metaphysical notion of truth directed 
Rorty toward Heidegger’s hermeneutics, which, 
as I have said, is more about the effects than 
the origins of truth. In the Synergos Seminars 
at George Mason University in 1982 Rorty 
declared that hermeneutics is not only linguis-
tic but also essentially anti-Platonic and there-
fore capable of overcoming our epistemologi-
cal tradition. Rorty specified that
what Nietzsche—and, more gen-
erally, “hermeneutics”—has to tell us is not that 
we need a new method, but rather that we 
should look askance at the idea of method. He 
and his followers should not be viewed as offer-
ing us a new set of concepts, but rather as of-
fering a certain skepticism about all possible 
concepts, including the ones they themselves 
use ... they should be seen as urging us to think 
of concepts as tools rather than pictures—prob-
lem-solving instruments rather than firm foun-
dations from which to criticize those who use 
different concepts.42
We can now affirm that Heidegger, Vatti-
mo, and Rorty did not see in hermeneutics 
a philosophy or an alternative way forward for 
philosophy to elucidate texts, represent reality, 
or translate communication but, on the contra-
ry, a thought beyond these alternatives. Against 
the architects of hermeneutics (Pareyson, Gad-
amer, and Ricoeur), Rorty and Vattimo have 
redirected hermeneutics to respond to Hei-
degger’s destruction of metaphysics and its con-
sequences. The aim of weak thought’s herme-
neutics is to continue generating new words 
within our language. Although neither Hei-
degger, Vattimo, nor Rorty ever affirmed that 
“Being is conversation”,43 this idea responds 
not only to the destruction of Being as pres-
ence but also to the new fundamental question 
philosophy: “How is it going with Being?” In 
order to justify this thesis, it is necessary to em-
phasize the difference between dialogue and 
conversation, in other words, between Gad-
amer’s conservative hermeneutics and weak 
thought’s progressive hermeneutics.
While Rorty and Vattimo gave Gadam-
er’s philosophical hermeneutics great signifi-
cance throughout their writings, they are both 
much closer to Heidegger’s postmetaphysical 
thought than to Gadamer’s hermeneutic theo-
ry. This is confirmed in both Georgia Warnke 
and in Jean Grondin, two distinguished inter-
preters of Gadamer who have accused Rorty 
and Vattimo of misreading the German mas-
ter’s hermeneutics. While Warnke reminds 
39 Rorty, R., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford, Blackwell, 1980), p. 315.
40 Rorty, R., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 325.
41 On this concept of truth, see Rorty’s and Engel’s discussion in R. Rorty and P. Engel, What’s the Use of Truth? ed. P. Savidan, trans. 
W. McCuaig (New York, Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 47-59.
42 Rorty, R., in “Rorty on Hermeneutics, General Studies, and Teaching”, in The Synergos Seminars, vol. 2, Fall, 1982, George Man-
son University, p. 14.
43 Investigations into the philosophical meaning of conversation can be found in T. W. Crusius, Kenneth Burke and the Conversation 
after Philosophy (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois University Press 1999) and more recently in Dmitri Nikulin On 
Dialogue (Lexington Books 2005).
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Rorty that Gadamer does not replace truth 
with edification but rather “sees hermeneutics 
as an assessment of validity claims”,44 Grondin 
goes even further in considering Vattimo’s ni-
hilistic interpretation of Gadamer’s famous the-
sis (“Being that can be understood is language”) 
a “form of linguistic relativism”45 that cannot 
be found in the German master. Both Warnke 
and Grondin are correct, and they find a con-
firmation of their criticism in Heidegger, who 
considered hermeneutical philosophy “Gad-
amer’s business”,46 in other words, radically 
different from the existential thought he was 
looking for. However, this difference comes 
not from hermeneutics’ interpretative func-
tion but rather from Gadamer’s inherent met-
aphysical search for truth through dialogue. 
While “truth” for Gadamer is a goal that can 
be reached through dialogue, “conversation,” 
for weak thought, hermeneutics is a way to 
avoid “asking the question of what is or is not 
real”,47 that is, truth.
Although Gadamer did not pursue Hei-
degger’s destruction of metaphysics, he did fol-
low his insistence on language (as the house of 
Being) in order to specify the fundamental 
role language plays in our existence. Gadamer 
pointed out that language is not only the “house 
of Being” but also a “house of the human be-
ing, a house where one lives, which one fur-
nishes, and where one encounters oneself, or 
oneself in others”.48 In these encounters lan-
guage becomes a “we” where we are all assigned 
a place in relation to one another in order to 
understand because “Being that can be under-
stood is language”. Language is the “element in 
which we live, as fishes live in water ... in lin-
guistic interaction we call it a conversation”.49 
However, there is a fundamental difference 
within this linguistic interaction that must 
pointed out. 
While literally the German words “Ge-
spräch”, “Dialog”, and “Unterhaltung” should be 
translated as “discussion”, “dialogue,” and “con-
versation”, most translators of Gadamer’s works 
have rightly translated “Gespräch” as “conver-
sation”. This is not because of linguistic arbi-
trariness but because of a philosophical de-
mand implicit in its meaning. “Gespräch” does 
not allude to something programmed in ad-
vance under the direction of a subject matter, 
wherein the partners leave aside their particu-
lar prejudices, but, on the contrary, a genuine 
“Gespräch” is never the one we wanted to con-
duct but rather one we fall into as it develops. 
This is why we cannot decide to become in-
volved in a conversation, assume a position of 
leadership within it, or extricate its truth but 
must instead wait for these functions to appear 
on their own; we are always led by the conver-
sation. However, our being always led by the 
“Gespräch” does not mean that truth will never 
appear but rather that it will always be a con-
tingent effect of its own unprogrammed fac-
tors, which we never have under control. This 
is why “Gespräch” is closer to what in English 
we call “conversation” and not “dialogue,” which 
is a specialized category of conversation aimed 
at finding truth, as in the Platonic dialogues. 
In these dialogues both interlocutors not only 
44 Warnke, G., “Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences: A Gadamerian Critique of Rorty”, in Richard Rorty, vol. 4, ed. A. Mala-
chowski (London, Sage, 2002), p. 182.
45 Grondin, J., “Vattimo’s Latinization of Hermeneutics: Why Did Gadamer Resist Postmodernism?” in Weakening Philosophy, ed. 
S. Zabala (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), p. 211.
46 Heidegger, M., letter to O. Pöggeler, 5 January 1973, in Pöggeler, O., Heidegger und die Hermeneutische Philosophie (Freiburg, 
Alber 1983).
47 Rorty, R., “Being That Can Be Understood Is Language,” in Gadamer’s Repercussion: Reconsidering Philosophical Hermeneutics, 
ed. B. Krajewski (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004), p. 26.
48 Gadamer, H-G., Das Erbe Europas (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1989), p. 166-173.
49 Gadamer, H-G., The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. L. E. Hahn, Library of Living Philosophers (Chicago, Open Court 
Press, 1997), p. 22.
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had the subject matter and its outcome under 
control but also were interested in convincing 
its audience of a specific truth. To be in a con-
versation instead means allowing oneself to 
be conducted by the subject matter because a 
conversation does not have a goal. While truth 
values are the main issues in a dialogue, con-
tingent, unprogrammed, and interchangeable 
interpretations are the main concern of a conver-
sation. Conversation is free from any meta-
physics, epistemology, or representationalist 
modalities, and this is why Rorty emphasizes it 
as the “ultimate context within which knowl-
edge is to be understood” in his 1979 classic, 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
Although it is not explicit whether Gad-
amer meant conversation or dialogue by “Ge-
spräch”, the fact that truth was significant for 
him allows us to distinguish his hermeneutics 
not only from Heidegger’s “different concep-
tual platform” but also from Rorty and Vatti-
mo’s weak thought. Also, and most important, 
elucidating this difference allows us to notice 
how “conversation” is weak in comparison to 
“dialogue,” where truth is the primary goal and 
control the necessary condition. However, it is 
just this weakness that responds not only to 
the “worn-out” condition of Being after its de-
struction but also to the new postmetaphysical 
question, “How is it going with Being?” As I 
said before, this question was formulated by 
Heidegger in order to “work out Being anew” 
since the working out then does not depend an-
ymore on the correct representation of Being 
but rather on the condition, state, or remains 
of Being. As in a conversation Being is not set 
apart but simply interpreted in order to allow 
us to come to terms with metaphysics, which 
we cannot overcome but must maintain in or-
der to avoid falling into it. 
Finally, it should not come as a surprise 
that Rorty’s contribution to a collection of es-
says on the analytic and continental divide in 
2003 was entitled “Analytic and Conversa-
tional Philosophy” and Vattimo’s latest book 
Farewell to Truth.50 Both are invitations not 
only to enlarge the branches of contemporary 
philosophy through conversation but also, as 
Heidegger said, to “remain in conversation 
with that to which the tradition of philosophy 
delivers us, that is, liberates us”:51 the Being of 
beings. 
50 Prado, C. G. (ed.), A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy (New York, Humanity Books, 2003). 
Rorty’s essay was recently reprinted in his last collections of papers: R. Rorty, Philosophy as Cultural Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 120-130.
51 Heidegger, M., What Is Philosophy? trans. J. T. Wilde and W. Kluback (New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 71.
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